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Focus paper
In the last two decades, over two-thirds 
of OECD countries have augmented 
families’ capacity to choose schools for 
their children beyond those closest to 
their homes (Musset, 2012).  The aims 
of school choice are to improve (1) the 
matching between children and schools 
and (2) students’ educational outcomes. 
At the same time, (3) there are equity 
concerns around school choice as maybe 
disadvantaged  families are less able to 
exercise choice.
Generally, parents are asked to submit 
a list with their ranking of schools, and 
then a set of rules determines the final 
allocation—so-called school choice 
mechanisms.  One of the most widely used 
procedures in school choice is the so-
called Boston mechanism. This mechanism 
assigns all applicants to the school ranked 
first, and if there is overdemand for a 
school, ties are resolved according to 
priorities. These priorities can be defined 
through a random lottery or according 
to criteria such as distance to the school, 
existence of siblings in the school, or other 
socioeconomic variables. Those rejected 
from their school ranked first can opt 
for the seats that remain free only after 
considering everyone’s school ranked first. 
This process drastically reduces the chances 
of being accepted in any particular school 
after being rejected from one’s school 
ranked first. This may lead families to avoid 
overdemanded schools, to avoid rejection 
from those schools. Priorities for residence 
may seem innocuous, but they can have 
a large impact on parents’ behavior. They 
may lead families to perceive that the 
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In Calsamiglia and Güell (2014) we exploit 
a very rich administrative data set that 
contains all primary school applications in 
the city of Barcelona, Spain. We observe 
that in any given year, around 80 percent 
of families apply for a neighborhood 
school.  But by observing parents’ choices 
at a point in time, one cannot identify 
whether this behavior results from 
families’ preferences for the neighborhood 
schools or from families applying for a 
safer school. We exploit an unexpected 
change in the definition of neighborhood 
occurring in 2007 to assess whether it is 
preferences or safety that drives parents’ 
school choice. The set of schools for which 
families have priority changed with this 
new definition of neighborhood, and 
that this change is exogenous to families. 
Our key insight is that if parents choose 
according to their preferences, then a 
change in neighborhood definition should 
not systematically change their choices. 
Instead, if parents play it safe, then a 
change in neighborhood definition may 
affect their choices.
We focus on families’ schools ranked 
first and find that after the change in 
neighborhood definition, families avoid 
applying for the old neighborhood 
schools and apply to the new 
neighborhood schools. 
Figure 1. School 
description for a 
family living on the 
corner of the district.
                   2005        2006        2007      2008        2009         2010
Percentage of families applying for YN schools  18 21 10 7 8 8
Percentage of families applying for NY schools  10 9 17 18 18 17
Percentage of families applying for YY schools  51 56 63 65 64 65
Percentage of families applying for NN schools  19 13 8 9 10 10
    
In order to illustrate these changes we 
classify schools for each family as follows:
n Yes-Yes Schools (YY hereafter): in 
the old neighborhood and in the new 
neighborhood.
n Yes-No Schools (YN hereafter): in the 
old neighborhood but not in the new 
neighborhood.
n No-Yes Schools (NY hereafter): not in 
the old neighborhood but in the new 
neighborhood.
n No-No Schools (NN hereafter): not the 
old neighborhood and not in the new 
neighborhood.
The following picture illustrates this 
classification for a family living at the 
corner of the old neighborhood. Diamonds, 
pentagons, triangles, and hexagons in 
these graphs represent schools. The 
(orange) building is a particular family/
address. The (green) square represents the 
old neighborhood, and the (purple) circle 
refers to the new neighborhood.
If families play it safe, the change in 
behavior should be such that they stop 
ranking first schools that are no longer 
in their neighborhood. Consequently, 
the proportion of families that ask for YN 
schools should decrease between 2006 and 
2007, which is exactly what we observe 
in Table 1. The proportion of families that 
ask for YN schools was reduced from 21 
percent to 10 percent, which is a decrease 
in demand of 52 percent. 
Moreover, if families play it safe, the 
change in behavior should be such that 
they start ranking first schools that are in 
their new neighborhood, because these 
schools now give them priority points. 
Consequently, the proportion of families 
that ask for NY schools should increase 
between 2006 and 2007, which is exactly 
what we observe in Table 1. above
The proportion of families that ask for NY 
schools increased from 9 percent to 17 
percent, which is an increase in demand of 
89 percent. This very large increase indeed 
suggests that safety, rather than parents’ 
preferences, plays a crucial role in choosing 
a school.
 
This implies that the gains of school 
choice in terms of matching of children 
and schools seem limited, because the 
equilibrium allocation is not very different 
from that without choice, where children 
are assigned automatically to their 
neighborhood school. 
One important concern in the debate 
regarding the B-mechanism is that naive 
parents, being unable to strategize, may 
be harmed by the system (see Pathak 
and Sönmez, 2008).  Abdulkadiroglu et al 
(2006) report that in Boston, 19 percent 
of parents seem to be naive, playing a 
dominated strategy. We also find a similar 
fraction of parents exhibiting seemingly 
naive behavior. By merging our application 
data with register data, we can rationalize 
some of their behavior. Register data allow 
us to understand how bad the outcome is 
for those taking risks in this game. We find 
that of those who are unlucky and do not 
get their school ranked first, 14 percent 
of them go to an outside option, mainly 
private school (although only 4 percent 
of schools are private in Barcelona), and 
around 30 percent do not get any of the 
schools that they ranked. 
Our application data set was merged with 
the population census data in order to yield 
information about parents’ socioeconomic 
characteristics. Having this information 
allows us to analyze the level of education 
for these families. Figure 2 shows that 
those who are particularly harmed by the 
system, that is, by not getting any of the 
schools  ranked in their application, have 
systematically lower levels of education 
than those applicants who do not take 
any risk. Similarly, those with higher levels 
of education can take higher risk and 
therefore have greater access to the best 
schools in the city. 
Our empirical evidence suggests that 
under the B-mechanism, (3) important 
inequalities emerge, because the 
mechanism provides those who can afford 
private school with an outside option that 
allows them to play a riskier strategy in 
the public assignment and have a better 
chance of getting the best schools in the 
public system.
This paper shows that with the BM, 
priorities overtake the role of preferences 
for most applicants. The risk involved in 
stating preferences is not worth taking, 
leading most of the applicants to apply 
for one of the neighborhood schools, 
independently of the identity of those 
schools. Only a few families who have 
the option of private school if they are 
unhappy with their allocation can take the 
risk of stating their preferences. Those 
who dare to take risks without having an 
outside option are particularly harmed by 
the system, which rationalizes why most 
families do not take risks. 
Table 1. Families’ first choice over the years
June 2015
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